A Leak Resistant Architecture Against Side Channel Attacks
Overview & Synopsis
Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms may leak some information that can be used to recover cryptographic keys. This work combines reconfigurable techniques with the recently proposed Leak Resistant Arithmetic (LRA) to thwart some Side Channel Attacks (SCA). The introduced architecture outcomes the performance of classical implementation of modular multiplication, for key size exceeding 2048 bits, with a reasonable extra area overhead. Nevertheless, this is not a drawback, but a cost, since the main issue of the proposed architecture is the improved robustness in terms of security.
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hal.science)
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Document Information
| Document Title | A Leak Resistant Architecture Against Side Channel Attacks |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Daniel Mesquita, Lionel Torres, Benoit Badrignans, Gilles Sassatelli, Michel Robert, Fernando Gehm Moraes |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2006 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-69908 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |