Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol
Overview & Synopsis
Industrial systems are publicly the target of cyberattacks since Stuxnet [1]. Nowadays they are increasingly communicating over insecure media such as Internet. Due to their interaction with the real world, it is crucial to prove the security of their protocols. In this paper, we formally study the security of one of the most used industrial protocols: OPC-UA. Using ProVerif, a well known cryptographic protocol verification tool, we are able to check secrecy and authentication properties. We find several attacks on the protocols and provide countermeasures.
Indexed from repository: HAL Open Science
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hal.science)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Maxime Puys, Marie-Laure Potet, Pascal Lafourcade |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2016 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-34859 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |