Extending Mechanisms
Overview & Synopsis
Given an incentive-compatible mechanism for a single agent on a restricted domain of valuations, we consider its incentive-compatible extensions to the entire valuation space. We identify two extreme extensions: the "keep-the-menu" extension, which minimizes buyer payoffs and maximizes canonical prices pointwise, and the "keep-the-pricing" extension, which maximizes buyer payoffs and minimizes canonical prices pointwise.
Indexed from repository: arXiv
(
arxiv.org)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Extending Mechanisms |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan |
| Subject & Discipline | cs.GT |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2026 |
| License / Rights | arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
arXiv
(arxiv.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-270639 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on arxiv.org » |