MIG-COW: Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Deepfake Detectors via Gradient Decomposition
Overview & Synopsis
Despite recent advances, deepfake detectors remain vulnerable to adversarial examples, particularly in diverse, real-world settings. We propose MIG-COW, a novel adversarial attack framework that generates highly generalizable and visually imperceptible adversarial examples. By combining momentum-integrated gradients with a consensus-orthogonal decomposition, MIG-COW captures both shared and model-specific vulnerabilities across heterogeneous CNN and ViT detectors. On the AADD-2025 Challenge benchmarks, MIG-COW achieves a 99.96% white-box attack success rate (ASR) with high perceptual similarity (SSIM), significantly outperforming existing baselines. However, its limited 7.16% ASR against official black-box targets - despite achieving the best overall score - highlights the ongoing challenge of transferability. We also demonstrate that incorporating low-performing but diverse models in the ensemble can degrade attack effectiveness, underscoring the need for careful surrogate model selection in real-world adversarial settings.
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Document Information
| Document Title | MIG-COW: Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Deepfake Detectors via Gradient Decomposition |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Wonjune Seo, Joonhyuk Baek, Yeseong Jung, Saerom Park |
| Subject & Discipline | cs.CR |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2026 |
| License / Rights | arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
arXiv
(arxiv.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-265072 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on arxiv.org » |