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Ulysses: A Security Harness For Synthesizing Verifiable Web Exploits
Aditya Oke, André Vicente Duarte, Rui Melo, Shubham Gandhi, Nachiket Kotalwar, Charmi Khandor, Danqing Wang, Carolyn Rosé, Lei Li

Ulysses: A Security Harness For Synthesizing Verifiable Web Exploits

Science & Mathematics Published 2026 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

How can an AI agent automatically discover security vulnerabilities in any software repository? Existing approaches use LLMs to generate software vulnerability exploits. However, it is challenging for an LLM to reliably verify its own generated exploits. In this paper, we propose Ulysses, a multi-agent security harness to synthesize verifiable vulnerability exploits for web applications. Ulysses converts candidate vulnerability findings into verified Proofs of Exploitability by iteratively exploring exploit hypotheses and establishing success in independently observed execution effects. We evaluated Ulysses on WebExploitGym, a curated benchmark of exploitable instances from 25 real-world web applications that span 5 languages and 7 frameworks. Ulysses produces verified proofs for 10 of 25 real-world advisories. It also discovered 4 new proofs of exploitability that have never been previously reported.

Indexed from repository: arXiv (arxiv.org)
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Document Information

Document Title Ulysses: A Security Harness For Synthesizing Verifiable Web Exploits
Author / Organization Aditya Oke, André Vicente Duarte, Rui Melo, Shubham Gandhi, Nachiket Kotalwar, Charmi Khandor, Danqing Wang, Carolyn Rosé, Lei Li
Subject & Discipline cs.CR
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2026
License / Rights arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website arXiv (arxiv.org)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-263239
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on arxiv.org »