Detecting smartphone state changes through a Bluetooth based timing attack
Overview & Synopsis
Bluetooth is a popular wireless communication technology that is available on most mobile devices. Although Bluetooth includes security and privacy preserving mechanisms, we show that a Blue-tooth harmless inherent request-response mechanism can taint users privacy. More specifically, we introduce a timing attack that can be triggered by a remote attacker in order to infer information about a Bluetooth device state. By observing the L2CAP layer ping mechanism timing variations, it is possible to detect device state changes, for instance when the device goes in or out of the locked state. Our experimental results show that change point detection analysis of the timing allows to detect device state changes with a high accuracy. Finally, we discuss applications and countermeasures.
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Document Information
| Document Title | Detecting smartphone state changes through a Bluetooth based timing attack |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Guillaume Celosia, Mathieu Cunche |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2018 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-248730 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |