Response to Phil Gerrans
Overview & Synopsis
Phil Gerrans comments on Proust's paper entitled "Thinking of oneself as the same" raise two points; one has to do with the value of sceptical arguments about self-knowledge, the other with what a self can know of him/herself. These two comments are discussed. It is shown first that metacognition operates on content as well as on vehicles, which leaves every replica with her own numerical identity. Second, the homuncular fallacy is discussed as part of a response to the second point.
Indexed from repository: HAL Open Science
(
hal.science)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Response to Phil Gerrans |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Joëlle Proust |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2003 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-245081 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |