Genelle et al. revisited: Masking an AES round with only 4 secure ANDs
Overview & Synopsis
Side-channel attacks are very efficient against AES implementations. In consequence, countermeasures are needed. Many works studied how to efficiently mask the AES, and in particular its SBox. In this paper, we revisit Genelle et al. approach based on secure conversion between boolean and multiplicative masking, and show that with bitslicing along with other optimisations it enables computing a whole round with only 4 secure ands (SecAnd), making it very competitive in terms of performance. In particular, our second-order implementation is 1.18x faster than a fixsliced implementation, for similar binary size and security.
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Document Information
| Document Title | Genelle et al. revisited: Masking an AES round with only 4 secure ANDs |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Nicolas Belleville |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2024 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-230018 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |