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An NFC Relay Attack with Off-the-shelf Hardware and Software
Thomas Bocek, Christian Killer, Christos Tsiaras, Burkhard Stiller

An NFC Relay Attack with Off-the-shelf Hardware and Software

Science & Mathematics Published 2016 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

Passive Near Field Communication (NFC) devices, such as contactless smart cards, use NFC to communicate with other devices without any physical connection or an internal battery source, deriving power inductively via the radio field generated by the NFC reader device. Today, many Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals, credit cards, and also mobile devices are NFC-capable and facilitate contactless payments. Although the communication range is typically limited to a few centimeters, NFC attacks exist that exploit such contactless communication channels.This paper focuses on NFC relay attacks and shows that a practical relay attack on public transport PoS terminals, using off-the-shelf mobile devices and hardware, is feasible. Finally, countermeasures are discussed with the main finding that currently the best countermeasure against relay attacks is to physically shield an NFC device.

Indexed from repository: HAL Open Science (hal.science)
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Document Information

Document Title An NFC Relay Attack with Off-the-shelf Hardware and Software
Author / Organization Thomas Bocek, Christian Killer, Christos Tsiaras, Burkhard Stiller
Subject & Discipline Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2016
License / Rights Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website HAL Open Science (hal.science)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-179940
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on hal.science »