Economics & Development

Accurate and scalable methods for land area measurement are essential for estimating key agricultural indicators, such as crop yields, as well as understanding agricultural relationships. A significant body of literature has demonstrated systematic bias in farmer estimates of land area, the most inexpensive option, and at the same time provided evidence supporting the use of handheld GPS units for objective measurement. Despite the successful adoption of handheld GPS measurement in many survey operations, new tablet-based tools offer potential for smoother, more cost-effective measurement of land area. Using data collected in a methodological experiment in Uganda, this study evaluates the accuracy and operational trade-offs of tablet-based area measurement tools, both with and without the support of GPS-boosting devices, relative to handheld Garmin GPS units. The findings demonstrate that both tablet-based approaches are highly correlated with handheld GPS measurements, with relatively small but statistically significant differences in means. On average, the boosted and unboosted tablet measures exhibit absolute percentage errors of approximately 11 and 12 percent, respectively, with underestimation more pervasive than overestimation. Importantly, the findings highlight that even small differences in land area measurement can lead to substantial variations in yield and production estimates, underscoring the critical role of the measurement method for agricultural productivity analysis and policy. From an implementation perspective, the tablet-based approach offers clear advantages, with a significantly reduced burden of data cleaning and processing compared to handheld GPS data and enumerators facing few technical challenges.

The development objective of Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance in Ukraine Project is to contribute to sustaining the government administrative and service delivery capacity to exercise core government functions at the national and regional levels. This paper seeks the approval of additional financing (AF) in the amount of EUR236 million (US$271 million equivalent) for a ninth additional financing (AF9). The PDO will remain the same as originally stated: to contribute to sustaining the government administrative and service delivery capacity to exercise core government functions at the national and regional levels. AF9 will enable continuation of this support at the same level as the Parent Project and previous AF operations by partially filling the existing financing gap and creating a new financing gap to enable continued financial support by development partners. AF9 will cover eligible expenditures from June 2025 to December 2026. The eligible expenditures under AF9 will be the same as under the AF8 as restructured in December 2025. As approved by Bank Management, up to 100 percent of financing committed under AF9 may be used to finance retroactive expenditures incurred up to 12 months before the signature of the loan agreement. Given the difficult fiscal situation, AFs have provided financing gaps that allowed the PEACE Project to absorb additional donor contributions as they became available. The AF9 provides for a financing gap of US$5 billion. Government estimates for AF9 eligible expenditures in 2026 not yet covered by the PEACE Project and other development partners’ financing are presented in Table 3 together with projections for eligible expenditures in 2026. The USD equivalent of eligible expenditures in 2026 is based on the exchange rate of 45 Hryvnia to the US Dollar applied in the State Budget for 2026. MoF determines the prioritization of eligible expenditures submitted for reimbursement. The amount of eligible expenditures reimbursed depends on the amount of funding available and any restrictions on the application of particular sources of funds.

Ratings of the Chad Local Development and Adaptation Project (ALBIA) for Chad were as follows: outcome was moderately satisfactory; Bank performance was satisfactory; M&E quality was modest. Lessons and recommendations are as follows. First, embed sustainability at design by calibrating ambition to context: begin with smaller, manageable plots backed by sustained technical assistance; assess ecological and institutional constraints upfront; define clear operations and maintenance and financing arrangements from the outset; and link investments proactively to follow-on operations to ensure continuity. Second, adopt adaptive management suited to fragile conflict and violence (FCV) contexts by maintaining a consultative approach throughout implementation and building in explicit adjustment mechanisms that allow timely course corrections while preserving strategic coherence and outcome focus. Third, strengthen monitoring and evaluation by keeping the results framework simple and unambiguous, recruiting qualified M&E staff early, and selecting realistic indicators with feasible data collection methods to support credible tracking, adaptive learning, and decision-making. Fourth, use natural resource management to mitigate conflict by prioritizing interventions such as pasture protection, firebreaks, and improved water access that reduce competition over land and water and foster peaceful coexistence among user groups. Fifth, ensure flexible implementation arrangements by allowing adaptability in the Financing Agreement regarding implementing partners, defining mandates and coordination modalities clearly, verifying capacity, and enabling course correction and robust oversight when performance issues arise.