A Steady Hand for Wobbly Steps : Why New Electricity Markets Need Vesting Contracts
Overview & Synopsis
New electricity markets carry inherent risks of volatility and market power abuse - teething troubles that can derail reform. Vesting contracts are transitional financial hedges imposed before privatization to stabilize generator revenues and protect retailers - and, ultimately, consumers - from price shocks. By mimicking the natural hedge of a vertically integrated utility, or the hedging portfolio of a mature, liquid market, these contracts provide a steadying hand during the shift to competition. Their successful implementation, however, requires precise modeling of price and volume to discipline market behavior without sacrificing short-term economic efficiency or stifling long-term investment.
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Document Information
| Document Title | A Steady Hand for Wobbly Steps : Why New Electricity Markets Need Vesting Contracts |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Chattopadhyay, Debabrata, Erten, Ibrahim Etem, Baronnet, Maelle, Malik, Kabir |
| Subject & Discipline | Brief |
| Categories | Economics & Development |
| Publication Year | 2026 |
| License / Rights | Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
World Bank Documents & Reports
(documents.worldbank.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-165045 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on documents.worldbank.org » |