Investment in Education in Developing Nations: Policy Responses When Private and Social Signals Conflict.
Overview & Synopsis
In most developing countries the net private benefit of higher education exceeds its net social benefit because education-related wage differentials are excessive and the beneficiaries of higher education are subsidized. The resulting political pressures seem to favor investment in education over the creation of employment opportunities. A more balanced allocation of investment may require the revision of basic policies dealing with wage determination, the incidence of educational costs, and the role of private sector education. The aim should be to narrow the gap between private and social signals and thus reduce excess private demand for higher education. (Author)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Investment in Education in Developing Nations: Policy Responses When Private and Social Signals Conflict. |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Edwards, Edgar O. |
| Subject & Discipline | Cost Effectiveness, Developing Nations, Educational Demand |
| Categories | Education & Pedagogy |
| Publication Year | 1975 |
| License / Rights | Public Domain / Open Access Educational Resource |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
ERIC (Education Resources)
(eric.ed.gov)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-148101 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on eric.ed.gov » |