Computer Science & Mathematics

The small Solar System bodies (SSSBs) preserve records of the formation and evolution of the Solar System. In particular, the near-infrared wavelength region around 3 $μ$m provides crucial insights into the origin and transport of hydrated materials and organics, although it is difficult to observe from the ground because of strong telluric absorption. We assess the observability of SSSBs as complementary science to the ESA Ariel space mission, operating in the visible to mid-infrared wavelength range (0.5--7.8 $μ$m). Using the NASA JPL Horizons ephemeris system, we evaluate the visibility of known SSSBs from 2032 to 2035. Our analysis shows that Ariel can spectroscopically characterize up to 402 unique SSSBs under a conservative limiting visual magnitude of $V=13.6$. If observations can be extended to somewhat fainter targets ($V=16$), the number of observable SSSBs could increase to 2144. Assuming operational scenarios in which one SSSB is observed every 3, 7, or 30 days over a four-year mission, the total numbers of observable targets would be 357, 209, and 49, respectively. We further model the spectral energy distributions of candidate targets to evaluate their observational performance. We demonstrate that Ariel can resolve critical absorption features, such as those at 2.7 $μ$m and 3.4 $μ$m, with a higher spectral resolution than the previous infrared survey with AKARI. Observations of SSSBs with Ariel can provide insights into the distribution and evolution of life-forming materials in the Solar System and constitute a scientifically compelling component of Ariel's complementary science program.

Selection bias in large language models (LLMs) can persist despite instructions to ignore presentation order or prompts that elicit reasoning. Recent efforts to reproduce Jev-style System One behavior have produced a growing family of models that predict probabilities directly over supplied candidates. Yet systematic comparisons of selection bias across Jev versions, Jev reproductions, and generative LLMs remain limited in multi-option tasks. This leaves a central question: does Jev-style decision structure reduce selection bias? We address this question with a simple test that shuffles options while keeping question and candidate content fixed. Across two Jev versions, twelve Jev reproductions, and six generative LLMs, we trace individual answers through eight presentations and compare them with fixed-order repetition. On our primary collection of 1,700 questions from two benchmarks, Jev's accuracy varies by less than two percentage points, yet its cumulative failure set expands by 27--29\% relative to the original order, with first failures continuing into the final presentation. This loss of initial successes is substantially larger than under fixed-order repetition, even for highly repeatable Jev reproductions. Nor does Jev show a general advantage over the LLM baselines in preserving correct choices. Aggregation offers limited protection: voting yields modest gains for Jev, while even unanimous answers are frequently wrong. These results expose a gap between repeatable decisions and decisions that remain correct across equivalent presentations, showing why stable accuracy alone cannot establish resistance to selection bias.

Shapley-value-based explanations are widely used for feature attribution in machine learning. However, in computer vision, a feature may reduce the target-class score when added to the complete genuine image, even when the predicted label remains unchanged. We formalize such features as contextual distractors and investigate their attributions under semivalues and the least core. Under a weak average marginal monotonicity assumption, we derive quantitative semivalue--least-core gap bounds and sufficient conditions based on the probability of sampling smaller contexts. We further show that shifting semivalue weights toward larger contexts decreases the signed gap. Finally, controlled image-classification experiments and evaluations on Salient ImageNet provide strong empirical support for our theoretical findings.

A vulnerability costs more to fix the later it is discovered. As coding agents generate code faster than developers can review it, software needs a first line of defense screening each new function in real time. LLM agents have recently become capable of finding real-world vulnerabilities by working as a security expert would: they run analysis tools, explore the surrounding code, test hypotheses and weigh the evidence before forming their own judgement. This reasoning, however, spans many model calls, so that each verdict takes minutes of compute, far too long for real-time screening. Faster detectors, which fine-tune deep learning models or prompt an LLM for a direct verdict, are less accurate: they judge a function without the context an agent gathers, and an LLM's generated verdict is unreliable even when given some of it. We present REVA (REal-time Vulnerability Analysis), an AI vulnerability detector that brings the security context and code understanding components behind agentic detectors into a single forward pass of an LLM. For each new function, REVA gives the LLM a pre-computed threat model of its module, lightweight static analysis findings and call-graph information. REVA leverages a trained probe to read the LLM's internal representations of the new function in this context. On PrimeVul's held-out test set, REVA on GLM-5.3-Flash reaches 60.0% accuracy in about one second per function. This matches VulTriage (59.2%), the state-of-the-art agentic detector, run on the same LLM, while being over 250 times faster and less than a tenth as costly. On the same prompt, the probe is 14% to 17% more accurate than the LLM's own direct verdict. Across three open LLMs, REVA is at least as accurate as VulTriage, and about 10% more accurate on two of them. An LLM's internal representations thus encode much of what agentic detectors obtain through reasoning.

Frontier multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can control robots without robot-specific training, but how their capabilities compare and interact with post-trained vision-language-action (VLA) and world action model (WAM) policies across manipulation demands remains to be thoroughly evaluated. In this report, we evaluate GPT-6-Astra on EBench as the core of an agent that controls a robot through an agent harness under the same visual and proprioceptive observation protocol as post-trained policies. We study two agent configurations: direct control, in which the agent generates waypoint commands directly, and harness with policy, in which it can also invoke a post-trained VLA or WAM policy for action execution. Under direct control, the agent achieves competitive overall performance relative to post-trained policies. It leads on short-horizon tasks and exhibits the least performance variation across generalization dimensions, whereas it underperforms post-trained policies on long-horizon tasks, tabletop manipulation, and high-precision contact-rich tasks. In the harness with policy, invoking a post-trained VLA or WAM combines the complementary strengths of both components, raising overall task success to the level of the strongest compared post-trained policies while substantially reducing token cost. However, performance remains below the per-task upper bound of the standalone components due to suboptimal policy invocation, fixed-instruction execution without subgoals, and grasp disruption when the agent resumes control. Overall, our study characterizes the capability boundary of a frontier MLLM agent and suggests directions for improving future agent harness design. Project page: https://internrobotics.github.io/EBench-Astra-Tech-Report/

In federated learning (FL), secure aggregation enables a server to compute the sum of local model updates of $N$ clients, without revealing any information on the individual model updates to the server, beyond their sum. Different clients may be subject to heterogeneous bandwidth constraints, and consequently may choose different numbers of quantization levels to represent the information they send. Most secure aggregation works require the clients to project the values of their update parameters to a common finite group (or field), which does not directly accommodate heterogeneous precision constraints on their transmitted masked updates. Existing approaches of secure aggregation with heterogeneous quantization levels reveal partial aggregates of model-updates, and can reveal segments of individual model updates, under certain dropout and client-server collusion patterns. To prevent this privacy breach, we propose an information-theoretic secure aggregation scheme that tolerates client drop-outs, and up to $T$ semi-honest clients that collude with each other and with the server, under heterogeneous quantization at clients. Our protocol utilizes the $(T+1, N)$ threshold black-box secret sharing construction, where secret shares of the client updates, despite belonging to distinct algebraic groups owing to different quantization, are generated from identical linear integer systems.