Explaining Escalation: The Security Dilemma in Three Contemporary International Conflicts
1857-9760
Abstract
This paper analyzes the security dilemma through a comparative qualitative study of three conflicts: Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Palestine, and Thailand–Cambodia. Despite differences in geography, scale, and actors, all three cases show how mistrust, misperceptions, and defensive actions perceived as offensive drive cycles of escalation. The Russia–Ukraine conflict illustrates a systemic dilemma, shaped by identity, sovereignty, spheres of influence, and NATO expansion. The Israeli–Palestinian case highlights the limits of the framework in asymmetric conflicts, where overt hostility reduces the role of misperception. The Thailand–Cambodia dispute demonstrates how symbolism and identity can escalate a minor territorial dispute into a broader national conflict. Overall, the study confirms the security dilemma as a valuable explanatory tool in International Relations, conditioned by identity, asymmetry, and hegemonic ambitions.